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This paper looks at the recent empirical literature on the eﬀects of
trade reforms on ￿rm level wages, employment and labor demand elastic-
ities in import-competing sectors. The focus is empirical investigations
using frameworks that allow for imperfect competition. Imperfect compe-
tition in product markets allows for changes in elasticities and markups
through trade reforms and thus brings about additional eﬀects on ￿rm-
level employment and wages. Further, there is the theoretical possibility of
this change in product demand elasticity leading to a change in ￿rm-level
labor demand elasticity. These issues are investigated in Kambhapati,
K r i s h n aa n dM i t r a( 1997) and Krishna, Mitra and Chinoy (forthcoming).
In this paper, I discuss the theory, methodologies and results of both of
these papers. Further, I investigate the bene￿ts of bringing in imperfect
competition in the labor market into the analysis of the labor market
impact of trade reforms and in that context discuss some of the recent
literature.
∗Paper prepared for the Workshop on the Impact of International Integration on Labor
Markets at the East-West Center, Honolulu, Hawaii on January 15 and 16, 2001.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The last two decades have witnessed major economic reforms in many develop-
ing countries. Trade liberalization has been the key element of these reforms. The
gains from free trade in distortionless situations are well understood by any student of
international trade. However, political constraints do not always allow the implemen-
tation of trade reforms. Within any society, there are gainers and losers from such
reforms and there are obstacles to designing redistributive mechanisms that ensure
sharing of gains from trade by all sections of society if and when the reforms are in
place.
However, when these reforms somehow get implemented, detailed studies of how
diﬀerent social and economic groups are aﬀected are extremely important. These
studies are a pre-condition for the design of eﬀective post-reform policies that ensure
a more even split of the gains from trade or, at the very least, that try to heal the
wounds of groups hurt by greater openness in trade.
A counterargument to the above in the case of developing countries is that these
countries are labor-abundant (capital-scarce) and so more open trade bene￿ts its more
abundant factor, labor and hurts its scarce factor, capital through specialization along
comparative advantage. Since ownership of capital is highly concentrated, it is the
very rich who are hurt and the very poor who gain. Thus, free trade seems to be a
wonderful way of reducing income inequalities in developing countries. So it appears
1that there is not even the slightest need for caring about spreading the gains from
trade or healing the wounds of these wealthy capitalists.
However, the story may not be as simple as described in a two factor Heckscher-
Ohlin world. The real world is plagued by imperfections that include all kinds of
distortions and frictions. These imperfections complicate the story and in their pres-
ence, theoretical arguments can be constructed where the poor, assetless workers in
developing countries can be hurt by trade liberalization.
Rodrik (1997) and Slaughter (1997) have emphasized a new linkage between open-
ness and labor markets: the possibility, particularly in imperfectly competitive con-
texts, for the elasticity of demand for labor to be higher in magnitude with greater
openness. The link between factor demand elasticities and product market elasticities
is directly established through Hicks￿ well known ￿fundamental law of factor demand￿
which states that ￿the demand for anything is likely to be more elastic, the more elas-
tic is the demand for any further thing which it contributes to produce￿ (Slaughter,
1997). Since product market elasticities are likely to rise with trade liberalization, this
means that, with greater trade openness, we should see an increase in labor demand
elasticities as well.1
1See Hammermesh (1993) and Slaughter (1997) for a more detailed discussion. It should be
emphasized also that the argument just stated can be made directly only in a partial equilibrium
context. For a critical examination of this linkage between openness and labor demand elasticities
in a general equilibrium context, see Panagariya (2000).
2As Rodrik (1997) notes and as explained in Krishna, Mitra and Chinoy (forth-
coming), rising elasticities have important consequences. These include the shifting
of the wage or employment incidence of non-wage labor costs towards labor and away
from employers, more volatile responses of wages and employment to labor demand
shocks and the shifting of bargaining power over rent distribution in ￿rms away from
labor and towards capital. Thus, workers can be put under greater pressure relative
to capitalists through trade liberalization.
Krishna, Mitra and Chinoy (subsequently referred to as KMC in this paper) at-
tempt to investigate the link between between trade openness and plant-level factor
demand elasticities empirically in a partial equilibrium, imperfectly competitive set
up. First an econometrically implementable theoretical model of a ￿rm operating in
an imperfectly competitive context is speci￿ed and predictions are derived about the
implications of changes in trade policy for labor demand elasticities. This is then
tested using plant-level data from the Turkish manufacturing sector from a period
when there were large scale changes in the level of trade protection (speci￿cally, the
trade reforms of 1984).2
Our analysis suggests that the linkage between greater trade openness and labor
demand elasticities as suggested by the theory may be empirically quite weak: In the
2This same episode, using the same exact data set, was examined in the classic paper by Levinsohn
(1993) which looked at the impact of trade reforms on industry markups and found strong support in
the data for the hypothesis that greater openness leads domestic ￿rms to behave more competitively.
3vast majority of the industries we considered, we are unable to reject the hypothesis
of no relationship between these variables. As we discuss in detail in the paper, this
￿nding remains robust to changes in the type of labor considered (all production
workers, overtime labor, externally contracted labor, female labor etc.) and quite
robust to changes in speci￿cation as well.
In the presence of labor market frictions, trade liberalization may generate short-
term costs borne mainly by workers who lose jobs in the shrinking, import competing
sectors. These workers would ultimately be absorbed by the expanding export sec-
tors. However, this process may be time consuming. Thus, empirically studying the
eﬀects of trade reforms on the levels and dynamics of industry-level and ￿rm-level
employment in the import competing sector is of considerable importance.
Surprisingly, most studies examining the impact of greater openness in trade on
employment have found very negligible or no eﬀect inspite of often a positive eﬀect
on wages. An explanation for this employment insensitivity provided by Kambhap-
ati, Krishna and Mitra (1997) rests on the presence of imperfect competition in the
product markets of the import-competing goods. Opening up the economy to foreign
trade would raise wages through the Stolper-Samuelson eﬀect as the demand for the
labor-intensive exportable goods increases and the demand for the capital-intensive
import-competing goods falls. This should have a negative eﬀect on employment in
the import sector. However, trade reforms also generate an opposing eﬀect, often
4referred to as the ￿pro-competitive eﬀect￿ in the literature. This eﬀect comes from
the increased competition from foreign products which makes the demand faced by
imperfectly competitive ￿rms more elastic. In other words, a liberalized trade regime
leads to more substitution possibilities due to a greater availability of or a fall in the
domestic prices of imported goods. This in turn results in lower markups and thus
higher output and employment for given factor prices, an eﬀect opposite in direction
to the Stolper-Samuelson eﬀect.
Kambhapati, Krishna and Mitra (KKM) break down the impact of trade reforms
into the above two eﬀects and empirically identify them using ￿rm level data from
India. Employment in Indian import-competing ￿rms does not show a change in
trend or levels in the post-reform period. However, a panel study of ￿rms clearly
shows that employment is negatively related to wages as well as markups. Thus, the
eﬀect of trade reforms on ￿rm level employment in import-competing sectors is ex
ante unknown if the precise magnitude of the opposing eﬀects of the reform on wages
and markups is unknown.
There are other studies that try to incorporate imperfection in the labor market
into the framework. These look at how employment and wages are aﬀected in indus-
tries where there is the possibility of rent sharing with employers. Greater opennes in
trade through eﬀects on competition can aﬀect the magnitude of these rents and thus
can have signi￿cant eﬀects on employment and the remuneration of the employees.
5Similarly, labor market immobility might dampen the eﬀects of trade on wages and
employment at the ￿rm level. In these contexts, I discuss papers by Revenga (1997)
and Currie and Harrison (1997).
2D o e s T r a d e A ﬀect Labor-Demand Elasticities? [Krishna, Mitra and
Chinoy (forthcoming)]
To demonstrate theoretically how changes in trade policy resulting in greater
product market competition and larger product market elasticities could work their
way to larger factor demand elasticities, and to establish theoretical underpinnings for
the empirical work to follow, KMC work with a model of monopolistic competition,
where each ￿rm faces its own less than in￿nitely elastic demand curve and where
there is assumed to be no strategic interaction between ￿rms.3
Specializing to the case where the only inputs are labor, capital, materials and
fuel in a Cobb-Douglas production function and letting w, r, m and f denote the
logs of the wage rate, the rental rate, materials price and the fuel price respectively,
each de￿ated by the industry-level average output price, the labor demand function
is then derived as
lijt = δ0 + δwwijt + δrrijt + δmmijt + δffijt (1)
3This approximates a situation in which there are a large number of varieties and each ￿rm is an
in￿nitesimal player but has some power over the pricing of its product
6where l is the log of labor demanded. Thus, the ￿nal estimating equation is
lijt = δ0 + δwwijt + δrrijt + δmmijt + δffijt + eijt (2)
where the error term eijt allows for random shocks to aﬀect the ￿rm￿s demand for
labor. In KMC, it is shown theoretically both for this special case with four factor
inputs as well as in the general case with n factor inputs that
∂|δw|
∂∈ > 0w h e r e∈ is the
absolute value of the elasticity of output demand faced by a ￿rm. This elasticity of
demand increases in magnitude with trade liberalization and thus, theoretically, given
the set up assumed, should result in an increase in the elasticity of labor demand, δw.
Equation (2) derived in the previous section is the basic estimating equation
and is estimated separately for each industry (although results using data pooled
across industries are presented and discussed later in this section as well). To take
into account within-industry ￿rm heterogeneity, both ￿￿xed eﬀects￿ and the ￿random
eﬀects￿ speci￿cations are estimated. To capture the eﬀect of change in trade policy on
the parameters in (2), intercept and interactive trade reform dummies (which take the
value of one for the post liberalization period) are introduced. KMC also experiment
with year-speci￿c intercept dummies (in place of the reform intercept dummy) to
capture year-speci￿c shocks common to all ￿rms in an industry.
Labor demand elasticities and their changes in each of the ten industries,
under the ￿xed eﬀects and random eﬀects speci￿cations, are presented in Table I.
The vast majority of the estimated elasticities (δw) lie within the range of -0.15t o
7-0.75. Thus, these fall well within what Hammermesh (1993) has identi￿ed as being
a reasonable range of values for labor demand elasticities. In eight out of ten cases,
under both ￿xed eﬀects and random eﬀects speci￿cations, the elasticity estimates are
quite tightly estimated.
The parameter of particular interest here is elasticity change, i.e., the parameter
corresponding to the wage variable interacted with the liberalization dummy - ∆δw in
Table I. Estimates of the changes in labor demand elasticities are small in magnitude
and largely insigni￿cant. In seven out of ten cases, under both the ￿xed eﬀects and
random eﬀects speci￿cations, the null hypothesis that the change in elasticity after
the reforms is zero cannot be rejected at the 5 percent level or indeed in most cases at
even a higher level of signi￿cance. The three industries where the null hypothesis of no
elasticity change is rejected are Metal Products (381), Non-Electrical Machinery (382)
and Electrical Machinery (383). In these cases the ∆δw estimate is negative, implying
that the absolute value of the own price labor demand elasticity goes up. However, in
one out of these three industries, namely, Metal Products (381), Levinsohn actually
found an increase in markup implying a reduction in the product demand elasticity
perceived by plants in this industry. Overall then, it appears that in Turkey industries￿
labor demand elasticities are subject to friction and do not respond to changes in
openness as predicted by the theory.
Alternative speci￿cations were attempted as well: In order to take into account
8the possible ￿xity of capital in the short run, (2) was estimated by dropping the
terms corresponding to rental rate of capital. Time-speci￿c intercept dummies (in
place of the reform dummy) were included (in addition to the ￿rm-speci￿ce ﬀects) in
our regressions. The results remain more or less the same with the estimates of own
price labor demand elasticities, their changes and the associated standard errors all
changing only negligibly.
Several issues regarding the validity of the estimation framework and the inter-
pretation of the results arise. First is the familiar issue of possible simultaneity and
correlation between the error term and the right hand side variables. The identifying
assumption made by KMC clearly is that labor supplies facing each ￿rm are perfectly
elastic, i.e., that shifts in the labor supply curve, an assumption that is justi￿able
when disaggregated plant level are used. Further, the concentration of most of the
plants (around 600 of them) in the Istanbul area rules out the possbility of any market
power for the average ￿rm/plant. Furthermore, introducing time speci￿c-dummies in
addition to ￿rm-speci￿ce ﬀects does not change elasticity and elasticity change es-
timates. The results with both these kinds of eﬀects are negligibly diﬀerent from
those presented in Table I (Table II of KMC). Any aggregate demand or productivity
shocks (which may simultaneously move labor demand and wage as noted earlier) are
thus accounted for - taking care of the bulk of this endogeneity problem.
Other than lagged endogenous variables, there are no variables in the data set
9that may be regarded as being exogenous. Using lagged variables as instruments is
problematic due to the short length of our panel (four years). KMC experiment with
the pooling of data across industries to use lagged variables as instruments. These
results turn out to be qualitatively the same as the uninstrumented ￿xed and random
eﬀects results.
Finally, KMC note, as does Slaughter (1997), that even though a correlation
between the wage and the error term will bias the elasticity estimates, there is no
reason to expect the post-liberalization elasticity change estimates to be biased one
way or the other. More precisely, there is no reason to expect the bias in the labor
demand elasticity estimate to be diﬀerent in one regime (post or pre-reform) than in
the other. This is con￿rmed by Monte Carlo simulations in KMC￿s paper.
A second issue concerns that of timing and lagged responses. I As Hammermesh
(1993) has noted, much of the adjustment in ￿rm labor demand takes place within
six months to a year. Thus, given that the Turkish data are annual, this is not a
serious problem.
A third issue is that of constancy of parameters across ￿rms is addressed by
experimenting with a random coeﬃcients (Hildreth-Houck) speci￿cation. The results
remain the same qualitatively.
As is common in the literature, cross price elasticities (of labor demand) and their
changes following the trade reform were not estimated with great precision.
10For robustness (and also independent interest in variations in labor demand elas-
ticities across worker types), the demand for female workers, contract workers and
overtime workers were considered separately. The elasticities again were quite tightly
estimated. However, as expected, their values are higher in magnitude than the ones
for overall labor as substitution possibilities are higher when we look at speci￿c kinds
of labor than in the case of labor in general. Changes in elasticity are again mostly
insigni￿cant following the reforms. As mentioned earlier, pooling data across indus-
tries to use lagged variables as instruments and subsequently to introduce tariﬀ and
import penetration interactions in place of reform dummy interactions do not yield
any qualitatively diﬀerent results.
The ￿nding that greater trade openness did not lead to greater labor demand
elasticities in Turkey at ￿rst thought seems somewhat inconsistent with Levinsohn￿s
(1993) ￿nding that greater openness did lead to reduced markups (just as theory
would predict). This is all the more puzzling since the markup equation estimated by
Levinsohn and the elasticity equation estimated in KMC follow from the same set of





















i = ￿ (3)
where ￿ denotes the industry markup, while w, r, m and f denote levels (unlike in
11the previous parts of this paper where they denoted logs) of factor input prices and
p is the output price. KMC are able to explain the source of the diﬀerences between
their results and those of Levinsohn￿s to be the imposition of (3) being satis￿ed with
equality across all factors in Levinsohn￿s paper. KMC￿s own re-estimation of Levin-
sohn￿s estimating equation allowing for markup coeﬃcients to diﬀer across factors
indicates that this result does not hold factor by factor. It thus appears that it was
the combination of input factors other than labor that generated his results. Thus, it
is the average (across factors) wedge between marginal products and factor rewards
that was estimated as the common markup in Levinsohn (1993) and shown to have
declined. What KMC have shown is that this decline did not take place factor by
factor. Changes in labor demand in particular do not seem to be playing a role in
the drop in average markup results estimated by Levinsohn.
3T h e O ﬀsetting Eﬀects of Trade Reforms on Import-Competing Em-
ployment [Kambhapati, Krishna and Mitra (1997)]
The standard argument under perfect competition is that trade reforms would lead
to a contraction of import competing sectors (and an expansion of the exporting
sectors) which would then hire fewer workers. Under imperfect competition, however,
employment eﬀects depend largely upon the change in the slope and position of the
demand curve faced by individual producers. It is rather trivial to show that with
12trade reforms, under imperfectly competitive conditions, employment could actually
increase in import competing ￿rms. Faced with a more elastic demand curve, some
employers in import-competing ￿rms may reduce their pro￿t margins per unit output
and instead produce more. This would have a positive eﬀect on their demand for
labor and this may at least to a certain extent oﬀset the reduction in the demand for
labor for the more standard reasons discussed above.
KKM start by estimating the following equation for the period 1989-1993, using
a ￿xed eﬀects speci￿cation to account for ￿rm heterogeneity:
(Lit/Li89)=β0 + β1(Trend)+β2(Dum)+β3(Dum∗ Trend)+eit (4)
where i indexes ￿rms and t denotes time. The ￿Trend￿ variable was set at 1 for the
year 1989, 2 for the year 1990 and so on. ￿Dum￿ is the trade reforms dummy taking
the value 1 for the post-reform period. ￿Dum*Trend￿ is simply the dummy term
interacted with the trend variable. As evident from Table II, most of the estimates
of β2 and β3 are insigni￿cant indicating that the overall eﬀects of the trade reforms
on trends in and levels of labor demand at the ￿rm level were quite insigni￿cant.
KKM outline a simple model in which monopolistically competitive ￿rms (en-
dowed with Cobb-Douglas technologies) are atomistic in their demand for factor in-
puts (posses no monopsonistic power in the factor markets). Under the above assump-
tions (and to absract from factor-input substitution), KKM arrive at the following
13￿rm-level demand for labor function (conditional on levels of other factor inputs)
which is the ￿rst order condition with respect to labor:
li = a0 + a1w + a2θ + a3ki + a4mi (5)
where, l denotes ln(L)a n dk and m denote the natural logs of K and M respectively
and θ is the price-marginal cost mark up. k and m themselves are endogenous and are
also determined from the ￿rm￿s pro￿t maximizing conditions. The theory clearly says
that a1and a2 should be negative and a3 and a4 should be positive. The estimating
equation, therefore, is
li = α0 + α1w + α2θ + α3ki + α4mi + α5D + ei (6)
where and D is the liberalization dummy that takes the value of one in the post-reform
period.
Note that liberalization will not change α1 and α2 as long as the Cobb-Douglas
production function assumed does not change. Note further that in KKM w is the real
wage with respect to ￿rm-level price (proxied in KKM￿s estimation by industry-level
price) and so the additional eﬀect of industry-level average price (the prices of the
rest of the ￿rms for each in￿nitesimal monopolistically competitive ￿rm) on ￿rm-level
demand is captured by the intercept term in KKM￿s estimation. In KMC, however,
14demand is clearly speci￿ed as a function of the ￿rm-level price as well as the industry
level price. Since the ￿rm price is endogenous, the labor demand function is clearly
derived in KMC as a function of the real wage which is there explicitly with respect
to the industry price. Since the real wage in the theory in KMC and KKM are quite
diﬀerent conceptually, the labor-demand elasticity in the former is a function of the
product demand elasticity, while in the latter it is not.
Thus, the following changes are expected to take place:
1. An increase in wages (the Stolper-Samuelson eﬀect) which would, ceteris
paribus, reduce the demand for labor (α1 < 0).
2. A reduction in the markup, due to intensi￿ed competition (arising from more
substitution possibilities) which would, ceteris paribus, cause producers to increase
their demand for labor (α2 < 0).
In order to capture the quantitative eﬀect of these opposing eﬀects, we estimate
the labor demand equation speci￿ed above. However, labor demand is a function of
capital (K) and materials (M) which in turn are functions of labor demanded as can
be easily seen by writing down the ￿rm￿s ￿rst order conditions of pro￿t maximiza-
tion. This endogeneity problem is solved by instrumenting capital and materials. w,
r and m, a time trend, the liberalization dummy, the tariﬀ rates and the markup are
assumed to be exogenous in our three-equation system (that consists of the factor de-
mands or rather the pro￿t-maximizing ￿rst-order conditions with respect to the three
15factor inputs).4 The exogeneity of markups is a strong asumption (made essential
by data limitations) that is true only when a ￿rm faces a constant elasticity demand
function at any point in time.
The labor-demand equation was estimated by using data on ￿rms from ￿ve dif-
ferent Indian industries. In order to capture the eﬀect of heterogeneous behavior
across ￿rms, (5) was estimated by allowing for varying intercept terms across ￿rms.
The random eﬀects regression (supported over ￿xed eﬀects by the Hausman statistic)
results are presented in Table III . First, from the table, it is clear that the labor de-
mand is negatively associated with the wage rate. In developing countries, we would
expect to see an increase in the real wage via the Stolper-Samuelson eﬀect after a
trade reform. This result implies a reduction in the amount of labor demanded in
the import-competing sector and is the traditional argument regarding labor that
emerges in any perfectly competitive trade model. Second and perhaps more inter-
estingly, the regression results show a negative association between the demand for
labor and markups, thus providing some empirical support for the theoretically sug-
gested ￿pro-competitive￿ eﬀects of trade reforms mentioned before. Thus, KKM￿s
results suggest that trade reforms which lead to a reduction in markups, which would
induce an increase in the demand for labor in import competing sectors would at least
partially oﬀset the reduction in labor demand caused by other factors.
4The system is then identi￿ed by both rank and order conditions.
164 Labor Market Imperfections and Other Eﬀects of Trade Reforms on
Wages and Employment [Revenga (1997) and Currie and Harrison
(1997)]
There are other eﬀects on trade policy on wages and employment if we allow for
imperfections in labor markets in addition to those in output markets. The fact that
trade reforms make product markets more competitive results in lower pro￿ts for
domestic ￿rms. This may have a negative eﬀe c to nw a g e sa n de m p l o y m e n ti nt h e
import-competing sector if workers are unionized and can capture part of these rents.
This is in addition to the straight forward negative eﬀect of the downward shift of
output demand and thereby of labor demand. Revenga (1997) shows using Mexican
data that this was indeed the case there. Besides the negative impact through the
standard channels, a signi￿cant proportion of the decline took place through the
adverse eﬀect on rents.
Her analysis was done in several steps. In the ￿rst step, she regressed ￿rm-level
wage on quasi-rents and the alternative wage (measured as the industry level average
wage).5 Another regression was run where the dependent variable was the quasi-rent
and independent variables included a vector of trade policy variables and some other
control variables. In further steps, reduced form wage and employment regressions
5Quasi-rent per worker was evaluated as (value of output - value of materials - rental costs - wage
bill evaluated at the alternative wage rate)￿employment
17with a vector of trade policy variables among other variables on the right hand side
are run. Combining the results of all these regressions, Revenga is able to break down
the negative eﬀect of trade policy on wages and employment into eﬀects through the
rent sharing and other channels.
Using ￿rm level data from Morocco, Currie and Harrison (1997) ￿nd that employ-
ment and wages generally were not aﬀected by trade reforms. They then empirically
investigate two theoretical possibilities. The ￿rst is that there are barriers to labor
mobility - a labor market imperfection. The second is that trade results in more
elastic product demand and smaller markups as well as induces higher productivity
through a pro-competitive eﬀect. All these have positive eﬀects on employment which
can counter the standard negative eﬀects on an import-competing ￿rm. Modifying
the growth accounting equation to allow for imperfect competition, Currie and Harri-
son are able to estimate the eﬀect of trade policy (tariﬀs and quotas) on markups and
productivity growth. They ￿nd that reduction in protection led to lower markups
and higher productivity growth, thus showing evidence of a channel that has positive
eﬀects on employment. Labor market imperfections on the other hand do not seem
to be important.
185 Conclusion
This paper looks at the recent empirical literature on the eﬀects of trade reforms on
￿rm level wages, employment and labor demand elasticities in import-competing sec-
tors. The focus is empirical investigations using frameworks that allow for imperfect
competition. Imperfect competition in product markets allows for changes in elas-
ticities and markups through trade reforms and thus brings about additional eﬀects
on ￿rm-level employment and wages. Further, there is the theoretical possibility of
this change in ￿rm-level product demand elasticity leading to a change in ￿rm-level
labor labor demand elasticity. These issues are investigated in Kambhapati, Krishna
and Mitra (1997) and Krishna, Mitra and Chinoy (forthcoming). In this paper, I
discuss the theory, methodologies and results of both of these papers. Further, I in-
vestigate the bene￿ts of bringing in imperfect competition in the labor market into
this framework and in that context discuss some of the recent literature.
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22Table I: Own Price Labor Demand Elasticity Estimates: Fixed Eﬀects
and Random Eﬀects
ISIC Fixed Eﬀects Random Eﬀects
Code δw ∆δw δw ∆δw
341 -0.66 (0.10) 0.04 (0.11) -0.51 (0.10) 0.07 (0.12)
351 0.02 (0.17) -0.02 (0.18) 0.014 (0.02) -0.02 (0.18)
352 -0.43 (0.05) 0.02 (0.05) -0.34 (0.06) 0.01 (0.06)
361 -1.03 (0.11)0 . 18( 0 . 15) -1.00 (0.12) 0.20 (0.15)
372 -0.94 (0.05) 0.11 (0.10) -0.9 (0.06) -0.15( 0 . 10)
381 -0.63 (0.05) -0.10 (0.05) -0.53 (0.05) -0.11 (0.05)
382 -0.57 (0.06) -0.12 (0.07) -0.49 (0.06) -0.14 (0.06)
383 -0.56 (0.06) -0.14 (0.06) -0.42 (0.06) -0.18 (0.06)
384 -0.53 (0.10) -0.1 (0.09) -0.24 (0.11)- 0 . 14( 0 . 11)
385 -0.33 (0.09) -0.06 (0.10) -0.06 (0.10) -0.04 (0.10)
Note: Figures in parentheses are standard errors
23Table II: Employment Trends in India
Estimating Equation:
(Lit/Li89)=β0 + β1(Trend)+β2(Dum)+β3(Dum∗ Trend)+eit
Industry β1 β2 β3
Overall 0.13* 7.03 -0.77
Diversi￿ed 0.21 7.37 0.09
Electrical Machinery 0.05 20.48 -0.21
Non-electrical Machinery 0.04* 2.72 -0.30
Electronics 0.46* -32 -0.34
Transport Equipment 0.07* -1.75 0.02
Note: * indicates statistical signi￿cance at the 5 per cent or lower levels.
24Table III: Labor Demand, Wages and Mark-ups
Estimating Equation: lit = α0 + α1ω + α2 lnθ + α3kit + α4mit + α5D + eit
Overall Electrical Non-electrical Electronics Transport
Machinery Machinery Eqipment
Wage -0.99* -0.68* -0.84* -1.06* -0.85*
Mark-up -0.54* -0.88* -0.55* -0.19 -0.67*
Liberalization dummy 0.32 0.04 0.09 -0.04 0.02
R2 0.63 0.67 0.67 0.57 0.63
Note: * indicates statistical signi￿cance at the 5 per cent or lower levels.
25